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Perhaps the least expected short-term consequence of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a 
serious aggravation in US-Turkish relations. After the Turkish Parliament dashed American hopes 
of deploying forces from southeastern Turkey on 1 March 2003, the US-Turkish deterioration 
raises questions about the health of the two countries' "strategic partnership." Some have opined 
that because the United States is a global power while Turkey is only a regional power, rather 
than "partners" Turkey and the United States are "allies" destined to conflict on key matters. 
It is too early to prognosticate on the future US-Turkish partnership; mixed indicators included 
harsh comments from Washington tempered by reassuring words by US diplomats in Ankara. 
Likewise, supplementary war funding contained $1billion in aid for Turkey, conditional upon the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) not obstructing US operations in Iraq. The departure from Turkish 
soil of American assets associated with Operation Northern Watch has also worried Turkish 
commentators, though the 22 June 2003 meeting between Secretary of State Colin Powell and 
Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül holds out the prospect that the tezkere krizi (parliamentary 
bill crisis) has been overcome in favor of humanitarian cooperation in Iraq.  
 
The question remains: how did two NATO allies with supposedly common interests fail to activate 
their strategic partnership regarding matters of deep mutual concern? Chagrined American 
editorialists have asked how a country funded and protected by the United States since 1946 
could let us down at this key time.[1] More telling, American officials have pondered how 
American (and Turkish) negotiators could fumble the ball so totally and publicly.[2] 
Appearances and Realities  
Conditions in November 2002 appeared optimal for Turkish-American cooperation in the Middle 
East. The Bush administration's defense and foreign policy principals were extremely enamored 
of a Turkish-American strategic partnership, however defined. In previous administrations, they 
had secured Turkey continuing Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and had a strong rapport with the 
Evren and Ozal governments (1980-91), culminating in the latter's active support of the United 
States in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Policy makers such as Undersecretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman felt they grasped Turkish politics.  
 
On Turkey's part, the time for cooperation likewise seemed propitious. After decades of 
reluctance to operate beyond Turkey's borders, the senior military echelon had enthusiastically 
advocated cooperation with UN peace-keeping efforts in Somalia and the Balkans. In 2002, 
Turkish forces led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at American urging, 
demonstrating Ankara's commitment to cooperation with the United States in the War on Terror. 
With the promotion of Hilmi Özkök as CGS-TAF (Turkish Armed Forces), it appeared America 
had gained an influential ally among Turkish decision-makers. As opposed to the previous CGS 
who had been somewhat reserved towards the United States, Özkök had spent long years at the 
NATO HQ in Brussels, and was on record as pro-American. 
 
While the 1999-2002 Ecevit government—combining a secularist left of center party with an ultra-
nationalist party—had repeatedly expressed apprehension towards Iraqi regime change, the 
victors of Turkey's November 3 election were the new politicians of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP). AKP boosters in Europe and the United States presented it as combining Islam, 
sincere Westernism, and democracy with enthusiasm for close relations with the United States.  
 
At first glance, failure to operationalize the US-Turkish alliance occurred when circumstances 
augured best for success. Other factors, however, generated sub-optimal conditions:  
• Large sectors of the Turkish population felt Turkey's economy and security had been 
undermined by American approaches to Iraq since 1990.  
• A consensus of Turkey's political elite looked upon a new US invasion with distaste.  
• The AKP government had run on an anti-establishment platform and was quite new to 
power. Without a team of foreign policy professionals comfortable with their own 
bureaucracy, AKP officials confronted an exceedingly congested agenda, involving a 
bleeding economy, negotiations over EU entrance, and Cyprus reconciliation, while 
European and Middle Eastern countries were sending Ankara discouraging signals on 
Iraq.  
• The AKP government itself was not crystallized. The party leader R. Tayyip Erdogan was 
maneuvering among the president, the court system, and the military to remove a ban 
preventing him from entering parliament. AKP Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and the 
Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis were stand-ins with ambiguous decision-making authority.  
• The TAF distrusted the AKP, and did not welcome it receiving support in Washington. 
Turkish generals would have preferred the AKP to lose face either for an unpopular 
decision to cooperate with the United States, or for rejecting the American overture and 
forfeiting diplomatic-financial rewards.  
• Ankara's security elite is extraordinarily exercised about Northern Iraq and its Kurds. After 
a ten-year war against the Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) during which the latter 
found refuge in Northern Iraq, the TAF's single most important priority was to prevent 
regional destabilization affecting southeastern Anatolia—the war against the PKK was 
Turkey's own 'war on terror', trumping other considerations.  
Thus, repeatedly expressed Turkish misgivings; AKP perceptions of basic domestic political 
needs vis-à-vis the electorate and levers of bureaucratic/military power; and the TAF attitude to 
AKP and Northern Iraq rendered the United States request to deploy between 50-95 thousand 
personnel in Turkey to invade a neighbor without hostile intent towards Ankara nearly impossible 
for the civilian government to deliver, based on a calculus never grasping the importance to the 
post-9/11 American administration of regime-change in Iraq.  
 
Given the expedited military timetable, the new Ankara government viewed subsequent US 
negotiating intensity alternately as hardball inappropriate to 'strategic partnership', or as proof that 
Turkey was so indispensable to US plans that the AKP could hold out for the most optimal terms. 
This led to semi-official American accusations of Turkey being an unfriendly haggler, thus 
strengthening the rejectionist faction within the AKP, who could refer to intense popular 
opposition to the impending war as justification for refusing to cooperate.  
 
Further, by requiring the TAF to curtail its own Northern Iraq operations so as to secure Iraqi 
Kurdish cooperation during and after the war, American diplomats made it quite difficult for the 
army to forthrightly support cooperation with the United States. Rather, American concerns to 
balance commitments to disparate regional allies reinforced Turkish suspicions going back to 
1991 about American goals, so that the army came to see alliance with America as merely the 
least injurious step on an ill-advised path.[3]  
"Pressure", "Whingeing and Whining": A Diplomatic Timeline 
On 25 February 2003, Turkey's NSC—through which the combined service chiefs usually clearly 
articulate TAF preferences—forwarded a bill of cooperation to the Turkish Parliament, yet with no 
endorsement. This bill authorized the entry of 62,000 US troops into Turkey, as a combination of 
the 4th Infantry Division, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 255 fixed wing and 65 rotary wing 
aircraft, unspecified special operations units, and combat support. The bill authorized limited TAF 
deployment into Northern Iraq, given US concerns. On March 1, the bill earned a plurality of 
parliament members' support, but not an absolute majority. American-Turkish strategic 
cooperation failed to materialize by four votes. 
The March 1 vote was nearly eight months in the making, with a number of key chronological 
way-points: 
Phase I: July—November 2002 
• 14-17 July In Ankara, Wolfowitz and Grossman meet government officials. Wolfowitz is 
very clear on targeting Iraq, desiring Turkish cooperation. PM Ecevit reacts negatively, 
citing economic blowback and Kurdish destabilization, opining the situation was already 
totally out of control. Press editorials associated with AKP begin to speak of new US 
'Sykes-Picot' design for Middle East. New elections set for November.  
• Oct 21-3 CinCNATO Ralston, CinCCentCom Franks visit Ankara, discussing with civil, 
military leaders a possible Turkish role. Ecevit: "we are advising that it [the US] abandon 
the idea."[4]  
• Nov. 3 AKP Electoral victory. Senior party leaders evince reservations about war and 
refer to importance of UN legitimacy, but state commitment to the United States. New 
CGS Özkök departs for consultations in the United States: "a peaceful solution to the Iraq 
problem must be pursued…. But if a military operation proves unavoidable, it must be 
undertaken on internationally legitimate grounds."[5]  
Phase II: December 2002—January 2003 
• Dec 3-4 2002 In Ankara, Wolfowitz and Grossman make official request of month-old 
government. TFM Yakis: "we will cooperate with US because it is a big ally and we have 
excellent relations."[6] Yakis announces Turkey would allow use of airbases in war. US 
official remarks "this is the green light we've been waiting for." Wolfowitz "confidently 
predicts" Turkey would help.[7] Foreign Ministry indicates Yakis expressed personal 
opinion only. PM Gül insists Turkey committed to nothing, amidst rumors US pressuring 
Ankara for a quick yes. Turkish sources emphasize concerns about a war's financial 
damage—citing losses in 1990-91 and 'unfulfilled' US promises, number of US troops to 
be allowed into Turkish territory, and scope of TAF operations. Pew poll: 83% oppose 
any Turkish role in war.  
• Dec 10 AKP leader Erdogan invited to White House, planned as decisive US show of 
support both for AKP as legitimate leaders in Turkey and Turkish EU effort—to elicit 
Turkish commitment to war. TAF leadership displeased.  
• Remainder of December Negotiations. First US murmurings of Turkish difficulty; 
growing Turkish complaints that the process is moving too fast, US is "reading us wrong. 
It is not a matter of $1b or $2b—we do not feel comfortable with this war,"[8] and Turkish 
commitment before UN deliberations is premature. US advocacy for Turkey ineffective at 
EU. Wildly varying reports emerge of US requests (15-90 thousand troops) and Turkish 
demands ($4-30 billion).  
• First half January 2003 Major slow down. Turkish government signals importance of 
parliamentary and UN vote, as per Article 92 of the Constitution. PM Gül undertakes 
Middle East peace offensive, emphasizing goal of obviating need for war through Iraqi 
disarmament. Increasingly vocal US frustration with "marketplace idea of how much the 
Turks can squeeze out of this by whingeing and whining,"[9] including "blunt letter" from 
Wolfowitz to Gül. Senior Turkish generals grouse about American insistence and 
government indecision: "even the worst decision is better than indecision."[10]  
• Jan 20 CJCS Myers in Ankara to dispel tension: "any idea that we're impatient, or that 
we're making demands here, is not the case."[11] FM Yakis indicates renewed readiness, 
but for only 15 thousand US troops. Erdogan scores insufficiency of US aid offers ($2 
billion in grants and $2 billion in loans), given ongoing economic crisis in Turkey.  
• Jan 31 Turkish NSC calls for vote on US deployment in Turkey and Turkish deployment 
in Iraq in accordance with the Constitution. NSC does not prescribe date for vote.  
Phase III: February - Early March 2003 
• Feb 6-14 Gül ends Middle East summitry, agrees to vote on deployment of US personnel 
to upgrade Turkish C3—following "diplomatic blitz" by US officials. Parliamentary vote 
authorizes US upgrade teams. Debate is acrimonious, party discipline violated: 30-50 
AKP deputies vote against bill.Economics Minister Ali Babacan and FM Yakis visit 
Washington for 'final' negotiations on aid. Official Turkish statements emphasize need to 
convince Parliament through large aid package. US offer: $6 billion in grants and $20 
billions in loans, in return for Turkey permitting 40,000+ US troops. Turkish request 
reportedly $32-40 billion, most in grants.Certain NATO states reject transfer of anti-air 
assets to Turkey.  
• Feb 18-25 Postponing vote on US deployment, AKP government in intense negotiations 
with US, regardng size of American aid package; numbers and legal status of US troops 
in Turkey; extent of TAF deployment in Northern Iraq; status of Kurdish Peshmerga; 
guarantees for Iraqi Turkmen.Several US agreement deadlines broken. US 4th off coast 
of Turkey, 35 more ships en route.  
• Feb 25 Turkish cabinet forwards cooperation agreement to parliament, ending "bizarre 
Ottoman-style carpet shop haggle."[12] It is incomplete on certain technical, financial, 
military issues. Government "not satisfied with the agreement, but due to pressure, 
pressure from US, it decided to forward it."[13]  
• March 1 Turkish NSC meets, does not offer firm recommendation on bill. The vote: 264-
250 in favor, 19 abstentions, missing overall majority by four.  
Certain important dynamics emerge from this selective review:  
• Though serious consultations began after the AKP victory, dynamics since July had 
already formed an ambience uncongenial to US interests.  
• Intermittent, intense periods of US-Turkish negotiations and US pressure on Turks were 
separated by Turkish-initiated slow-downs and hedging.  
• Interludes involving Turkish domestic politics, EU negotiations, NATO debates, and AKP 
peace summitry complicated US-Turkish negotiations.  
• Reports of the negotiations' military, political, economic substance fluctuated wildly from 
November up until March, increasing tension.  
• At different points comments of senior US military commanders temporarily ameliorated 
tensions with Turkish negotiators. Generally, the US DoD took the negotiating lead. The 
State Department was a junior partner, with Secretary Powell and Ambassador Pearson 
late entrants. 
The American Post-Mortem 
During and after the US-Turkish negotiations, American officials articulated several criticisms 
regarding their counterparts in Ankara: 
1. AKP inexperience. AKP's excessive party political focus prevented them from seeing the 
domestic force multiplier effect of foreign policy success. They misread significance of 
certain events such as the Bush invitation to Erdogan, misread US intent, exaggerated 
Turkey's own importance, and demonstrated a persistent indecisiveness. This 
indecisiveness extended to the public relations realm: AKP leaders never clearly 
articulated to the public that it was in their interests to assist the US—the media was not 
deployed, and the bully pulpit was left unused.[14]  
2. Military inaction. The military-dominated NSC did not live up to its role as supreme 
arbiter on matters of national security broadly interpreted. TAF abdicated the 
responsibility of dictating to AKP neophytes the strategic interests of the country. US 
officials—and certain Turkish analysts—have claimed that by not indicating its desires to 
the AKP, the army forfeited much prestige and bears responsibility for a decision 
damaging bilateral relations. In this scenario, the army's insistence would have permitted 
the civilians necessary cover to support an unpopular agreement.  
3. Failure to act as an ally. A consistent American complaint has been that Turkey failed to 
reciprocate for fifty years of US support. Strategic partnership requires active assistance, 
especially when the US was offering Turkey great rewards. Rather, Turkey responded 
with conditions indicating a lack of trust, materially complicating the latest American 
initiative in the war on terror. There are three related issues here:  
a) While US vessels were offshore, the AKP kept upping their price, thus changing the 
spirit of the process, which America viewed as Turkey doing its utmost in the War on 
Terror.  
b) AKP insistence on the Turkish constitution requiring UN/international legal sanction or 
a parliamentary vote was a negotiating smokescreen. These 'requirements' could have 
been finessed. Rather, AKP used it avoid making a tough decision.  
c) By traveling around in fruitless summitry and inviting senior Iraqi officials to Ankara for 
consultations, PM Gül wasted precious time—even when US intent was clear. 
AKP and the Road to No 
These criticisms reflect profound disappointment at the highest echelons of US government. 
Going into the negotiating process in November, US diplomats assumed Turkish compliance. 
That Turkey had supported the US from North Korea to Afghanistan encouraged this view, as did 
the assumption that Turkey had so much to gain from cooperation with the US, and too much to 
lose from non-cooperation.  
It appears that the US view—parallel to initial enthusiasm in academia—was that the AKP was 
moderate, and supported US policies in the Muslim world.[15] American diplomats' experiences 
with 1980s and 1990s Turkey also suggested that: 
1. Turkish political parties are oligarchies exacting total allegiance from MPs;  
2. The military will run the show on bedrock issues of strategic concern; and  
3. The TAF was well-disposed to US plans.  
In thus assessing the approach of new government, US policy makers may have listened to the 
wrong Turkish experts, who advocated for AKP and who downplayed real disagreements. US 
officials did not alter initial assumptions, though on both the civilian and military level new 
dynamics required reevaluation. 
 Unlike earlier Turkish political parties, AKP leaders cannot exercise oligarchical control. AKP is a 
mixed bag of people associated with various elements of Turkish Islamism, an idea variously 
interpreted. Bottom-up autonomously resilient vernacular politics adds to the survivability (some 
say internal democracy) of Turkish political Islam.[16] Yet, this political genesis—distinct from 
Turkey's other major parties from the 1950s-1990s—lessens the ability or even inclination of 
leaders to 'control' constituents in and out of parliament.  
 
Some AKP MPs—perhaps 30%—are holdovers from the more uncompromisingly Islamist and 
anti-US Refah Party (banned in 1998). From the start they worried that the 'moderate' Erdogan 
and Gül would sacrifice party interests. This vote was a way to keep the party on track. If we want 
to see party dynamics in terms of personalities, three elements emerge:  
1. PM Gül, followers. Pragmatists, they did not wish to alienate the United States. Yet, 
strong ideological perception of Turkey as a Muslim nation made this group reluctant to 
appear to be the US' regional policeman.  
2. Parliamentary Speaker Arinç group. Representing the unreconstructed Refah hardcore 
from 1995-98, they were determined to prevent Turkish cooperation. Arinc himself 
already had an uncongenial reputation among US diplomats. He and his associates view 
a close relationship with America as political/economic servitude.  
3. Party Leader Erdogan. Though hoping to minimize damage to AKP-US relations, his 
major goal was getting into parliament and becoming PM. Domestic objectives were 
uppermost in his mind: safeguarding AKP popularity; preventing a rupture in AKP-military 
relations that could lead to AKP's illegalization; and preserving his own leadership in AKP 
(read: preventing a Refah hijacking of AKP).  
More broadly, the AKP government just did not want war, pursuing a 'maybe it'll go away' 
approach. Gül in particular misread until mid-February clearly-communicated American intentions. 
Beyond a domestic-economic agenda, AKP government evinced no concrete strategic vision, and 
never achieved foreign policy momentum from November 2002 to March 2003. 
AKP inexperience proved telling. The principal Turkish interlocutors had never held their jobs 
before, and had little time to learn how to navigate in foreign policy. Rather, at key points, 
competing for their attention were fundamental internal economic, political, and party challenges. 
Two manifestations of inexperience were decisive:  
1. Misreading the significance of key events. The White House invitation to Erdogan was 
extraordinary. Still an un-elected and illegal politician, he was treated as presumptive 
leader of Turkey. Fixated on domestic political requirements however, Erdogan missed 
the value of strong endorsement by President Bush if AKP fulfilled the quid pro-quo on 
Iraq. Such an endorsement could have strengthened him in AKP, in parliament, in 
Turkey's domestic politics, perhaps even regionally. Instead, unlike the Bush-Özal 
common vision of 1990-91, Erdogan appeared shocked by the American approach to 
Iraq. Without his own strategic vision, Erdogan missed the inescapable implications of the 
US approach for what Turkey would ultimately have to do. He returned to Turkey 
seemingly thinking AKP could prevent the war, preserve its domestic standing, and 
finesse US-Turkish relations. 
2. Mixed messaging and faulty signaling. The new government displayed a certain 
distrust of the US and Turkish foreign policy establishments. In particular they did not yet 
perceive the latter as their own, considering it slavishly secular and Western oriented. 
Early on, AKP officials stopped using the embassy channel in both the United States and 
Turkey, using instead a wide variety of unofficial interlocutors and people they knew 
personally as semi-authorized go-betweens. Yet, Ambassador Logoglu in Washington is 
a professional diplomat respected by his US counterparts. Advocates for AKP likely 
falsely advertised to US diplomats Turkish readiness to cooperate on US terms. Further, 
back channel, parallel communication made US officials wonder who was in charge, and 
whose messages counted. 
Mercurial Military? 
Turks attempting to put a good face on the March 1 vote herald it as democracy in action—
civilians made a parliamentary decision based on an evaluation of public sentiment, without 
military intimidation. Remarkably, Arab and Greek commentary seems to concur. By contrast, US 
officials expressed disappointment that the TAF had not exercised "the strong leadership role that 
we would have expected," by dictating a yes vote to the AKP.[17] This has elicited complaints in 
Islamist-affiliated media[18] that the United States does not in fact favor democracy, as 'proven' 
by American expectations of TAF determination of government policy, occupation policies in Iraq, 
support for the Israeli government, and lack of meaningful dialogue with President Khatemi of Iran. 
Why did the Turkish military pass up the opportunity to cement security relations with the United 
States in a fashion guaranteeing increased military assistance and influence on the post-Saddam 
security regime in Northern Iraq? Western analysts have suggested a divide within the TAF; the 
Turkish high command has adamantly rejected this notion. In this scenario, while a faction 
associated with Özkök is pro-US and inclined to cooperation, a less congenial grouping is 
affiliated with preceding CGS Kivrikoglu. Appointed to senior positions in the General Staff, NSC, 
and service academies prior to Kivrikoglu's retirement so as to prolong his influence, they were 
reserved towards the United States, desired much greater TAF freedom of action, and 
entertained partnerships with Russia, a "Turkic world," and China.  
As the TAF is a non-porous hierarchically-sound organization particularly at its upper levels, this 
is guesswork. There is indeed a long-standing strain in Turkish military thinking —the "Turkey has 
no friends" approach—that mistrusts motives even of allies. All armies have a certain amount of 
hyper nationalism. 
 
Concrete TAF security concerns, in both the foreign and domestic context, are more telling. From 
the mid 1990s, the TAF nurtured tremendous misgivings about US plans in Northern Iraq, 
particularly regarding the Kurds. In this view considering Northern Iraq a matter of southeastern 
Anatolia, Operation Provide Comfort and the Iraqi Kurdish safe haven aided anti-Ankara Kurds 
affiliated with the PKK. The latter prosecuted an insurgency in southeastern Turkey which 
sputtered until 1999, after thousands of casualties, reciprocal brutality, and finally PKK attrition 
and the capture of their leader Abdullah Öcalan. That he had been hosted by the Greek embassy 
in Kenya prior to capture showed Turkey's Kurdish problem had also become an Achilles heal 
vis-à-vis Greece, Syria, and even Iran. Likewise, the conflict was economically catastrophic, 
consuming so much of the military budget as to prevent long-overdue force-restructuring and 
modernization.  
US diplomats did not assuage TAF concerns that this no-win situation would not reemerge. In the 
run-up to war, American discussions of joint military operations with Iraqi Kurdish opposition 
groups—some of whom had intermittently condoned PKK actions in the 1990s—was 
operationally sensible. Yet, it cooled TAF enthusiasm to sign onto southeastern Turkey becoming 
an American combat corridor. Likewise, American efforts to limit the TAF deployment in Iraq out 
of consideration for Kurdish warnings of the "serious consequences" of a Turkish army 
incursion,[19] and suggestion that TAF units be subject to overall US command, could be justified 
as preventing a war within a war or C2 confusion. Still, this was anathema to TAF commanders.  
American exigencies also threatened the TAF sense of sovereignty. With a military tradition 
perceived as going back to the fourteenth century, Turkey would not submit to foreign command 
structures on or adjacent to its own territory. Furthermore, the last time large numbers of foreign 
troops had been on Turkish soil was immediately after WWI, during a European occupation of 
Istanbul and parts of Anatolia. The war to eject these forces became the foundational crucible of 
the Turkish Republic, still commemorated ubiquitously. That the TAF rejected the entry of British 
ground forces from the beginning of negotiations on OIF suggests the strength of that memory. 
More than money, if Turkish cooperation was judged necessary, its military-political price tag 
would have been assuring the Turkish military that they would remain masters in their own house.  
TAF commanders worried from the start that war in Iraq would go wrong on these counts. Yet, for 
that very reason they desired Turkish inclusion, as only this could protect Turkey's strategic 
interests and preserve the essential relationship with the United States—army commanders said 
as much in March. These concerns have continued to today, with the TAF attempting to square 
the US-Kurdish-Turkish triangle.[20]  
Still, Turkey's generals did not clearly urge the government to say yes early or often enough. 
Rather than pecuniary reasons, misgivings discussed above could not be sidestepped. Also, 
while the army has long been an untrammeled entity undoing civilian governments in 1960, 1971, 
1980, and 1997-98, in all of those cases, it had been able to cite convincing domestic security 
concerns or the clear support of influential sectors of the public. Given the total opposition to war 
in Iraq among the Turkish public, a TAF or NSC diktat to the AKP would have undermined the 
army's prestige, and may have increased the popularity of the Islamist ruling party. Conversely, a 
yes vote without military pressure could have injured the AKP, a goal of the secularist army. Even 
here then, domestic politics informed foreign policy judgments.  
 
Policy Lessons?  
It is tempting to blame the Turkish environment for the lack of cooperation during OIF. Yet, the 
United States might derive certain policy lessons: 
1. As the global hegemon advocating system-destabilizing intervention, America could have 
demonstrated greater diplomatic adroitness. At key points, American actions were 
interpreted as cultural insensitivity—references to "haggling," "Ottoman-style bazaar," etc. 
This is especially important in negotiations with smaller allies. From the outset the United 
States will appear more powerful, threatening and pressuring, especially in an ambience 
of the War on Terror. American officials have admitted to an arrogant assumption of 
Turkish docility, suggesting the implications of this insensitivity.[21]  
2. Regardless of our interests, potential regional partners prioritize their own perceived 
strategic needs, viewed through the prism of domestic politics. US negotiators must 
grasp local dynamics. Diplomacy is indeed a multi-level game.[22]  
3. A strong a priori assessment of the strategic map is also essential. Two operational fronts 
were not essential to OIF victory. One may conjecture that two fronts could have doubled 
combat casualties, fatal accidents, etc. The rapid success of American troops—slowed 
more by sandstorms and prudent field commanders than Iraqi forces —raises the 
question whether US negotiators pushed Turkey too hard on a matter ultimately not 
mission critical, but guaranteed to spark acrimony.  
4. Given US congressional midterms and Turkish elections, the diplomatic and military 
tracks were out of sync, injuring our signaling ability. Still, the United States might better 
calibrate efforts among its own departments.  
5. By all accounts the principal American negotiators were exceedingly skilled. Their 
seeming inability to account for potential problems vis-à-vis Ankara recommends a more 
streamlined means to provide accurate information and analysis to leaders whose time is 
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